November 2, 2026
Host
Welcome to the podcast. Today we're diving into the regulation of controlling shareholders in Canadian corporate law. It's a topic that affects everything from small family businesses to massive public companies. I'm joined by an expert in business organizations. Let's start with a fundamental question: what exactly is a controlling shareholder?
Guest
Thanks for having me. A controlling shareholder is someone who can control the outcome of shareholder votes. Typically, that means holding more than 50% of the voting shares. But it's not just about the percentage. It's about the ability to direct the company's decisions.
Host
So de jure control is the obvious one: 50% plus one. But you mentioned it's not just about the percentage. What about de facto control?
Guest
De facto control is when a shareholder has less than 50% but can still control votes because many shareholders don't show up. For example, if only 40% of shareholders vote, a shareholder with 20% could control the outcome. It's like winning an election because your opponents stayed home.
Host
That's a great analogy. So apathy can give power. What about negative control?
Guest
Negative control is the power to block special resolutions. Special resolutions require a special majority, often two-thirds of votes cast. So if you hold just over one-third of the shares, you can block those resolutions. That's de jure negative control. With low turnout, even 10% might be enough de facto.
Host
So control isn't just about owning half the company. It's about wielding influence. Now, let's talk about the types of resolutions. What's the difference between an ordinary resolution and a special resolution?
Guest
An ordinary resolution requires a simple majority of votes cast. That's 50% plus one. A special resolution requires a special majority, which in BC is at least two-thirds and not more than three-quarters, as set out in the articles. In the federal CBCA, it's at least two-thirds. Special resolutions are for major changes like amalgamations or winding up.
Host
So special resolutions are harder to pass. That gives minority shareholders some blocking power. Now, what duties do controlling shareholders owe to minority shareholders? At common law, is there a fiduciary duty?
Guest
At common law, no. The leading case is Brant Investments from the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1991. It rejected the idea that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. However, the court left open the possibility that such a duty could be recognized through the oppression remedy.
Host
So the oppression remedy is the key mechanism. Let's talk about the Ebrahimi case. It's not an oppression case, but it influenced the remedy. What happened there?
Guest
Ebrahimi and Nazar were equal partners in a carpet business. They incorporated, and both became equal shareholders and directors. Later, Nazar's son joined, giving the Nazar family majority control. They removed Ebrahimi as a director and stopped his remuneration. Ebrahimi asked to wind up the company on just and equitable grounds.
Host
And the House of Lords agreed. Why?
Guest
Because the company was essentially a quasi-partnership. There was a personal relationship based on mutual confidence. The majority's actions breached the understanding that Ebrahimi would participate in management. It was unfair in substance, not just legally.
Host
So equitable considerations can override strict legal rights. That's a powerful idea. How did Canadian courts apply this?
Guest
Canadian courts applied Ebrahimi's principles to the oppression remedy, especially in close corporations. In Ferguson v. Imax, the court found oppression when a majority shareholder excluded his ex-wife from benefits after divorce. It was a family venture, and the resolution was a solution to the ex-wife problem.
Host
That's a fascinating case. The husband tried to restructure to redeem her shares. The court saw it as part of a lengthy course of oppressive conduct. Can you walk us through the facts?
Guest
Imax was a closely held company with three couples. The husbands controlled voting shares; the wives held preferred shares. The appellant, Mrs. Ferguson, was a founder and worked for the company, mostly unpaid. After divorce, her husband used control to exclude her from benefits. He tried to get her to sell shares, but she refused. The company declared no dividends except the minimum on preferred shares.
Host
So the husband was essentially starving her out. Then they called a special meeting to restructure and redeem her shares. The court found oppression.
Guest
Exactly. The court said the company wasn't acting bona fide. It was using money that should have been dividends to buy her out. The resolution was the culminating event in a lengthy course of oppressive conduct. The remedy was to order a buyout.
Host
So the oppression remedy allows courts to order a buyout. That breaks the old pro-majoritarian view. Now, let's talk about Scottish Co-operative. That involved a parent company oppressing a subsidiary's minority.
Guest
Yes. SCWS set up a subsidiary with Meyer and Lucas, who had expertise. SCWS owned 51% and controlled the board. After five years, they no longer needed Meyer and Lucas. They set up a competing business, sold supplies to themselves at lower prices, and withdrew support. They seemed to be waiting for liquidation.
Host
And the House of Lords found oppression. The nominee directors did nothing to defend the subsidiary. That's as bad as actively oppressing.
Guest
Right. The court said it's just as bad to do nothing when you should be doing something as it is to do something actively oppressive. The remedy was to order SCWS to buy Meyer and Lucas's shares at fair value before oppression reduced their worth.
Host
So the oppression remedy is powerful. But what about procedural considerations? For example, when a controlling shareholder tenders shares, do they owe a duty to other shareholders?
Guest
In Pente v. Schneider, the court said no obligation to sell shares, no obligation to sell to the highest bidder, and no duty to other shareholders in that context. The board's fiduciary duty remains to the corporation, but it's realistic to consider the majority shareholder's view.
Host
Another protection is majority of the minority voting. Can you explain?
Guest
That's when a transaction requires approval by a majority of shareholders excluding the controlling shareholder. It's used for related party transactions to ensure minority interests are protected. It's a way to level the playing field.
Host
Securities regulators also play a role. They can use public interest powers to protect minority shareholders. The Canadian Tire case is a classic example.
Guest
Yes. Canadian Tire had dual-class shares. The Billes family controlled voting shares. A takeover bid was made for 49% of voting shares to avoid triggering a coattail provision that would convert non-voting to voting. The OSC issued a cease trade order, saying it was contrary to the public interest.
Host
The OSC said it was an abusive transaction that would affect public confidence. So regulators can apply fiduciary standards even without a breach of fiduciary duty.
Guest
Exactly. The case shows that securities regulators will intervene to protect minority shareholders in takeovers and going-private transactions. They have broad public interest powers.
Host
Now, let's step back. Are controlling shareholders good for Canadian capital markets? There are pros and cons.
Guest
Pros: controlling shareholders monitor managers closely, which can lead to higher returns on assets and equity. Agency costs may come down. Cons: they may favor their own interests, leading to lower price-to-book ratios. Profits might be siphoned off. And they're harder to displace through hostile takeovers.
Host
Studies show mixed results. Some show higher profits but lower valuations. So it's not clear-cut.
Guest
Right. There's no consistent difference between widely held and closely held firms. Controlling shareholders have both positive and negative effects.
Host
Weaker shareholder rights can lead to more concentration of ownership and lower valuations. That's important for policy.
Guest
Yes. Expropriation by controlling shareholders impairs efficiency. So strong shareholder rights are crucial. We'll discuss that more in the next class.
Host
Let's wrap up. What are the key takeaways?
Guest
First, control can be de jure, de facto, or negative. Second, no common law fiduciary duty, but oppression remedy imposes quasi-fiduciary duties. Third, courts will intervene in close corporations and when majority acts oppressively. Fourth, securities regulators can use public interest powers. Fifth, controlling shareholders have pros and cons, and shareholder rights matter.
Host
Thank you for this insightful discussion. That's all for today.