November 16, 2026
Host
Welcome to the podcast. Today we're diving into shareholders' rights. This is a big topic in business law. We'll cover pre-emptive rights, voting, meetings, information rights, and auditors. But first, let's talk about the evolution of shareholder ownership.
Guest
Thanks for having me. It's a fascinating area. The evolution is quite interesting. In the 1800s, retail shareholders were common. Then institutions like pension funds and mutual funds became dominant. Now, technology has democratized investing.
Host
So it's a cycle? What's driving the return to retail shareholders?
Guest
Sort of. Apps like Robinhood and Wealthsimple have made it easy for individuals to buy shares. Also, there's a growing interest in corporate governance among everyday investors. People want to have a say in how companies are run.
Host
That makes sense. Let's start with pre-emptive rights. What are they?
Guest
Pre-emptive rights require a corporation to offer existing shareholders the opportunity to subscribe for new share offerings proportionate to their existing ownership. It's like getting first dibs on a pizza before your friends. It prevents dilution of your ownership stake.
Host
Can you give an example?
Guest
Sure. Imagine a company has 1,000 shares in total. You own 100 shares, which is 10% of the company. The company decides to issue another 500 shares to raise money. Under pre-emptive rights, you must be given the opportunity to buy 10% of the new shares, which is 50 shares. That keeps your ownership at 10%.
Host
So it's not mandatory?
Guest
Correct. Pre-emptive rights are not mandatory. They can be included in the company's articles or in shareholder agreements. Shareholder agreements are more common.
Host
Why would a company choose not to include them?
Guest
It can constrain the company's ability to raise capital quickly. Sometimes they need to issue shares to investors without the hassle of offering to existing shareholders first. But it can also be used to shift control, which is problematic.
Host
How so?
Guest
Pre-emptive rights can constrain improper issuance. For example, if a company issues shares to shift control of the company, that can be unfairly prejudicial to existing shareholders. Courts have found that if knowledge of a member's inability to participate in a pro-rata offering was a factor leading to the offer, it can give rise to oppression remedies. That's from Re a Company in 1989.
Host
And there's also Re Sabex International?
Guest
Yes, that case showed that even when there is a legitimate business purpose, pre-emptive rights can still apply. It's about preserving the value of shares. Prevents issuance of shares at undervalue.
Host
So pre-emptive rights protect against dilution and preserve value?
Guest
Exactly. They constrain issuance, avoid dilution, and preserve value. But they can be cumbersome. Shareholders might not have the funds to participate, and the company might need to raise capital quickly.
Host
Let's move to shareholder voting. Who has voting rights?
Guest
At least one class of shares must be voting. The default rule is that each share carries one vote, unless the articles provide otherwise. This is under CBCA section 24(3) and BCBCA section 173(1). Voting is a fundamental right—one of the features that separates shareholders from creditors.
Host
What about non-voting shares?
Guest
Even 'non-voting' shares have the right to vote for fundamental changes. For example, amalgamation, continuance to another jurisdiction, or sale of substantially all assets. Certain fundamental transactions must be approved separately by every class of shareholders. Also, articles may give contingent voting rights, like if they do not receive dividends for a certain amount of time.
Host
What is majority of minority voting?
Guest
That's voting that requires approval by a majority of disinterested shareholders. For example, BC Securities Commission MI 61-101 requires minority approval for certain related party transactions and business combinations involving public companies. There's also a common law requirement for ratification by majority of minority in cases like Wedge v. McNeil.
Host
How do shareholders exercise their voting rights?
Guest
There are three ways: written resolutions, which require much higher consensus; at a meeting in person; or at a meeting by proxy. Proxy voting is common, especially for public companies.
Host
Is voting effective? I've heard some say it's just a formality.
Guest
I'd push back on that. Some empirical evidence suggests that shareholder voting has little to no positive effect on corporate activity. There's a cost to shareholders becoming sufficiently informed, and the cost might not be worthwhile if they have a small holding. There's also a cost to the company to prepare and mail proxy materials. But that doesn't mean it's useless.
Host
But there are criteria for effectiveness?
Guest
Yes, according to Carol Hansell and others, for voting to be effective: investors must be in a position to make informed decisions; the rules of the voting system must be sufficiently explained; the vote must have full weight at the shareholder meeting; voters must have an economic interest attached to the security; and the system must be sufficiently transparent to inspire confidence.
Host
So there's room for improvement?
Guest
Definitely. Technology is making it easier for retail shareholders to vote. Software platforms are making purchasing shares and exercising voting rights much more accessible. But there are still limitations, like dual-class structures with sunset provisions.
Host
What are sunset provisions?
Guest
They are carefully drafted conversion clauses in dual class structures that convert high voting shares to low voting shares after a change of ownership or other events. For example, section 27(5) of Canada Goose Holdings Inc. articles.
Host
Let's talk about minority protections. What are coattail provisions?
Guest
Coattail clauses ensure that if a holder of high-voting shares sells control of the company, holders of low-voting shares receive the same takeover offer. It ensures equal treatment of shareholders during takeovers. It's a stock exchange requirement. As of 1987, the TSE will not list newly created restricted voting shares that lack a coattail provision.
Host
What about cumulative voting?
Guest
Cumulative voting gives minority shareholders a greater chance of electing a representative to the board. Each voting shareholder is entitled to cast a number of votes equal to the number of votes attached to their shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. For example, if you have 100 votes and there are 5 directors being elected, you have 500 votes. You can cast all votes in favor of one candidate or distribute them among candidates.
Host
Is cumulative voting mandatory?
Guest
No, the articles of the company can allow for cumulative voting. CBCA section 107 has detailed rules for how to carry out cumulative voting and prohibits directors from circumventing it. BCBCA doesn't have specific provisions; articles must set out rules.
Host
What about proxy voting?
Guest
Shareholders have the right to appoint another person to represent them at a meeting and vote their shares. That's under CBCA section 148(1) and BCBCA section 173(1). Directors must follow proxy rules, or resolutions may be deemed incurable nullities. There are rules about notice periods, providing proxy forms, and validity of proxies.
Host
What is solicitation of proxies?
Guest
Any communication or request intended to obtain, prevent the granting of, or revoke a shareholder's proxy. A dissident proxy circular is a formal disclosure document prepared by a shareholder who is soliciting proxies against or independently of management. It's expensive to prepare and distribute, requires disclosure of strategy, is time-consuming, and may attract legal scrutiny.
Host
There was a case about Brown v. Duby?
Guest
Yes, Brown v. Duby in 1980 from Ontario High Court. It showed that relatively informal communications may be construed as proxy solicitations, requiring an expensive proxy circular. That opens dissenting shareholders to lawsuits. Even a shareholder post on a public online forum was held to be a solicitation in Karnalyte Resources Inc v. Phinney in 2020.
Host
What did the 2001 CBCA amendments do?
Guest
They introduced exemptions from information circular requirements. For example, quiet solicitations: targeted solicitation to 15 or fewer shareholders by a shareholder (not the corporation). Also, the public broadcast, speech, or publication exemption: shareholders can make public communications through media, like press releases, statements on radio or TV, websites, or public speeches. It requires certain SEDAR filing. The company can issue a press release defending itself from dissident criticism without a proxy request.
Host
Who pays for proxy fights?
Guest
Management can use corporate funds to make their position known to shareholders. That's from London and North Western R.R. Co in 1907. They can use corporate employees, proxy solicitation firms, business relationships, legal expenses, etc. Shareholders can be reimbursed for dissent proxy circular expenses if supported by other shareholders, as in Goodwood Inc. v. Cathay Forest Products Corp and Pala Investments Holdings Ltd. v. Bristow. Expenses must be reasonable and bona fide, as per Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.
Host
What remedies exist for breach of proxy legislation?
Guest
There are several bases for enforcement: civil right of action, statutory liability, injunctions, and damages. A private right of action for breach of proxy legislation was found in Brown v. Duby and Goldex Mines. Statutory liability under CBCA section 247 allows a shareholder to seek a court order requiring directors to comply with rules. Section 154 allows a court to make any order it thinks fit where a proxy circular contains misleading, untrue, or missing material facts. Courts have used injunctions where misleading or incomplete proxy materials were sent by management. Damages are difficult to claim because it's hard to establish a personal wrong as opposed to a corporate wrong. Courts prefer injunctive relief. There are no Canadian cases where damages were awarded.
Host
Let's move to shareholder meetings. What types are there?
Guest
There are two types: annual shareholder meetings (AGMs) and special shareholder meetings. AGMs are required by statute. Special meetings can be initiated by the company or directors, court-ordered, or shareholder-initiated.
Host
What are the requirements for AGMs?
Guest
Must have an annual meeting each year within 15 months of the last annual meeting. Under CBCA section 133(1)(b) and BCBCA section 182(1)(b). The meeting determines things like election of directors, appointment of auditors, and presentation of financials. There are waivers possible by unanimous shareholder vote for auditors and financials.
Host
What about special meetings?
Guest
Directors can call a special meeting to deal with important business that arises between AGMs. For example, if contemplating a fundamental change that requires shareholder approval. Shareholders can also call meetings if they have at least 5% of issued voting shares. That's under CBCA 143 and BCBCA 167(2).
Host
What notice is required?
Guest
BCBCA: Directors must send notice of date and time of meeting at least 10-21 days but not more than 2 months before the meeting. CBCA: Not less than 21 days and not more than 60 days before the meeting. If directors choose a date for inequitable purposes, the court can intervene, as in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries Inc. Public non-voting shareholders must also receive notice under securities regulation.
Host
Do shareholders have a right to discussion at meetings?
Guest
Yes, shareholders entitled to vote have a right to discussion and debate at annual meetings under CBCA 137(1)(b). BCBCA has no specific clause. But there are limitations. As one case said, 'does not mean that shareholders who are bent on obstructing business and resolved on talking for ever should not be put down.' If a meeting chair tries to improperly stop a meeting before it's done, they can be replaced by a new chair and the meeting can continue.
Host
What about unanimous shareholder resolutions?
Guest
CBCA and BCBCA allow shareholders to sign written unanimous shareholder resolutions in lieu of holding meetings. This is good for small corporations where meetings may be expensive and time-consuming. Eisenberg v. Bank of Nova Scotia pre-dates statutes, so it's unclear if informal consent would still work in light of statutory provisions.
Host
What are shareholder proposals?
Guest
Directors manage the affairs of the company, but shareholder proposals allow shareholders to develop dialogue on corporate affairs. There are benefits to managers listening to shareholders' concerns about corporate governance, as noted in Michaud c La Banque nationale du Canada. But there's limited use in Canada because of the prevalence of controlling shareholders who can effectively veto proposals.
Host
How do proposals work under BCBCA?
Guest
Under BCBCA, shareholder proposals only apply to public companies. A company need not process a proposal in certain situations, including if they already have an AGM or other shareholder meeting scheduled; if it doesn't meet technical requirements; if it doesn't relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of the company; or if the primary purpose is securing publicity or enforcing a personal claim or grievance.
Host
And under CBCA?
Guest
Shareholders may make proposals to be considered at shareholder meetings under section 137. They can propose that articles be amended, a by-law be made, amended, or repealed, nominate a candidate for election of directors if they hold 5% or more of shares in a voting class, or residual issues as long as they comply with section 137(5). The corporation doesn't need to circulate a proposal for various reasons, including if it doesn't meet technical requirements, has the primary purpose of enforcing a personal claim or grievance, or does not relate in any significant way to the business of the corporation.
Host
There was a case about Varity Corp. v. Jesuit Fathers?
Guest
Yes, the court exempted the company from the mailing requirement for a proposal primarily for general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or similar causes. That was prohibited by the old CBCA. The legislation has since been amended to remove specific prohibitions and replace them with general wording: 'does not relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation.' It's unclear if the grounds for exemption would still exist using a narrow definition of business or affairs, as in Dodge v. Ford and Parke v. Daily News, or if they would be allowed using a broader meaning from the obiter in the Teck case.
Host
What about Michaud c La Banque Nationale du Canada?
Guest
The court refused to exempt the company from including shareholder proposals concerning executive compensation and board diversity. The bank argued the proposals were primarily aimed at promoting general economic, political, and social causes, obtaining publicity, and addressing a personal grievance. But the court found that preventing communication would be prejudicial as it was the only way of communicating with other shareholders. Civilized discussion of proposals would benefit banks and shareholders. The resolutions were ultimately defeated at meetings.
Host
So shareholder proposals can be effective?
Guest
Yes, success often comes from gaining enough support to pressure management into making changes. For example, in 2009, National Bank agreed to recruit more women to its board after a proposal sought 50% female representation. Also in 2009, shareholder proposals led four banks to adopt advisory votes on executive pay, while another agreed in advance.
Host
What about court-ordered meetings?
Guest
A court, on its own motion or application of the company, director, or voting shareholder, can order a meeting and provide directions for the meeting. The court can vary or dispense with quorum or notice requirements. This is under BCBCA 186(1) and CBCA 144(1). The court can order a meeting if it's impractical for the company to call a meeting, if the company doesn't call a meeting, or for any other reason the court feels appropriate.
Host
There are cases about quorum and deadlock?
Guest
Yes, in Re Edinburgh Workmen's Houses Improvement Co. Ltd., the court changed quorum where the original quorum imposed great difficulty as most members lived far away. In Ebrahim v. Continental Precious Minerals Inc., the court refused to change quorum where proxy votes could be used to solve impracticability. In Barsh v. Feldman, the court refused to change quorum in a 3-person corporation where it was designed to ensure no corporate action without consent of all.
Host
What about the court's power to order meetings?
Guest
The court's power to order a meeting does not expand shareholders' substantive powers. In Re British International Finance (Canada) Ltd. v. Bienvenu, there were two parallel boards purporting to act on behalf of the company. The court refused to order a meeting to allow an election as such elections were only allowed annually and had already occurred. But in Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. Boon-Strachan Coal Co., the court intervened to restore corporate democracy by allowing shareholders to exercise fundamental powers, particularly in election of directors. There were two parallel boards causing havoc, and the time for the AGM was near but the company had not prepared notice or proxy statements. The court ordered a shareholder meeting and set out parameters.
Host
And in Goodwood Inc. v. Cathay Forest Products Corp.?
Guest
The court ordered and supervised a shareholders' meeting where it was impracticable for the corporation to do so and judicial intervention was necessary. The board failed to hold an AGM, lacked quorum, was missing required resident Canadian directors, failed to meet disclosure obligations under securities law, and refused a shareholder's requisition to force a meeting. The court determined the board was dysfunctional and mismanaged, and that these were extraordinary circumstances justifying a court order for a meeting.
Host
What about shareholder-requisitioned meetings?
Guest
Shareholders who, in aggregate, have at least 5% of issued voting shares can requisition a meeting under CBCA 143(1) and BCBCA 167(2). If directors do not call the meeting within 21 days after receiving the requisition, the shareholder can force the meeting. Under CBCA 143(4), any shareholder who signed the requisition may call the meeting. Under BCBCA 167(8), any one or more shareholders with more than 1/40 of issued voting shares may send notice of a general meeting. This is often used to remove directors before their term ends.
Host
Are there cases about this?
Guest
Yes, Airline Industry Revitalization Co. v. Air Canada and Wells v. Bioniche Life Sciences Inc. The shareholders' ability to requisition meetings is subject to procedural compliance. The court will balance shareholder democracy with efficient corporate governance. The court won't order a separate meeting if doing so would impose unnecessary cost or disruption without materially advancing shareholders' rights. For example, where directors already set a meeting and there's no prejudice to the shareholder to wait.
Host
Let's talk about rights to corporate information.
Guest
Corporations must maintain specified records and allow shareholder access under CBCA sections 19-22 and 138, and BCBCA section 46. This enables shareholders to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the company to make informed decisions about whether to invest. It also helps them assess the performance of directors and officers and hold them accountable. If the company is public, anyone may inspect this information under BCBCA section 46(4).
Host
What information are shareholders entitled to?
Guest
Each shareholder is entitled to copies of the memorandum and articles, any ordinary or special resolutions, and the register of members. But this disclosure is not complete. For example, there's no information about customers, suppliers, or volume of business. The right to information cannot be unlimited, but is it sufficient? That's a matter of debate.
Host
Finally, the right to appoint an auditor.
Guest
It's mandatory that shareholders appoint an auditor under CBCA section 162 and BCBCA section 204(2). Shareholders may waive the appointment of an auditor by unanimous resolution of all shareholders, including non-voting shareholders. But CBCA does not allow public companies to waive, and in practice BCBCA public companies also cannot waive because of securities law.
Host
What are the qualifications for auditors?
Guest
Auditors must be qualified and independent. They must be given adequate access to records, documents, books, accounts, etc. Financials must be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles set by the Canadian Accounting Standards Board. There are specific removal procedures to prevent management from repeatedly replacing auditors who challenge them. External oversight for auditors of public companies exists. Large or widely held companies must appoint an audit committee comprised of at least three directors, the majority of whom are not officers or employees.
Host
What is the standard of care for auditors?
Guest
It may be found in the company's articles or contract with the auditor. Failing that, common law governs. Auditors are not obliged to undertake investigations to substantiate whether information is reliable unless they come across something that arouses suspicion. Traditionally, the auditor has been required to be a watchdog and is 'not bound to be a detective....or approach his work with suspicion....he is a watch dog but not a bloodhound. ...entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he take reasonable care.' That's from Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co.
Host
But there have been developments?
Guest
Yes, obiter in Haig v. Bamford stated that the complexities of modern companies have resulted in an increased responsibility to the public. Case law is not clear on the responsibility, but auditors should be under a duty to conduct their work in a manner which can be relied upon with confidence.
Host
What about the duty of care?
Guest
The duty of care of auditors is owed to the company (shareholders collectively) and does not give rise to a breach of an obligation to shareholders individually, as held in Hercules Management Ltd v. Ernst & Young. The role of auditors is to protect the company from consequences of incorrect financial statements and not to assist individual shareholders in making investment decisions. There's also Livent Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche.
Host
Are there concerns about auditors?
Guest
Yes, there are concerns about whether auditors play a credible role in corporate governance of public corporations. There were serious issues in the auditing process that enabled scandals like Enron and WorldCom in the US. In response, the US passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Canadian regulatory reform largely mirrored the US changes. The CICA created new independence standards for auditors in 2003. Canadian securities regulators released MI 52-110 defining the audit committee's role and composition. The Canadian Public Companies Accountability Board has been created.
Host
What about audit committees?
Guest
Certain companies must appoint an audit committee comprised of at least three directors under CBCA section 171 and BCBCA section 224. For BCBCA, it's public companies. For CBCA, it's large or widely held companies. The majority of the committee cannot be officers or employees of the company. The committee reviews financial statements before directors sign and present them to shareholders. The auditor has the right to appear before the committee, and the committee can require appearance. Securities legislation in all jurisdictions imposes higher restrictions on audit committees pursuant to MI 52-110.
Host
So shareholders' rights are extensive?
Guest
Yes, they are. But they are balanced against the need for efficient corporate governance. Shareholders' rights have evolved to protect investors and ensure accountability. But effectiveness depends on informed participation and proper enforcement.
Host
Great. Let's wrap up. Any final thoughts?
Guest
I think it's important for shareholders to understand their rights and exercise them. Whether it's voting, proposing resolutions, or accessing information, these rights are tools for holding companies accountable. But they also come with responsibilities, like staying informed and acting in good faith.
Host
Thank you for joining us. This has been a deep dive into shareholders' rights.
Guest
Thank you for having me. It's been a pleasure.